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Abstract
Using data obtained in a controlled ad-auction experiment that we ran,
we evaluate the regret-based approach to econometrics that was recently sug-
gested by Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (EC 2015). We found that despite
the weak regret-based assumptions, the results were (at least) as accurate as
those obtained using classic equilibrium-based assumptions. En route we
studied to what extent humans actually minimize regret in our ad auction,
and found a significant difference between the “high types” (players with a
high valuation) who indeed rationally minimized regret and the “low types”
who significantly overbid. We suggest that correcting for these biases and
adjusting the regret-based econometric method may improve the accuracy of
estimated values.
1 Introduction
The field of econometrics combines observational data with specific modeling as-
sumptions in order to estimate parameters of interest. It goes beyond mere statis-
tical analysis in that it assumes specific models of how the parameters of interest
relate to the type of data observed. On the one hand, these assumptions provide
power to econometric analysis by allowing it to estimate parameters that do not
directly appear in the data, but, on the other hand, the correctness of the whole
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estimation strongly depends on the correctness of the utilized model, i.e., on the
extent to which the situation at hand indeed conforms to the theoretical model.
In game-like scenarios, typical models assume that players are at an equilib-
rium. This is of course not a trivial assumption as we know that humans are
not fully rational and certainly do not always “find” an equilibrium point (see, e.g.,
[Kagel and Roth, 1995, Kagel and Levin, 2010] and the references therein). Beyond
the usual human lack of rationality, equilibrium assumptions are especially hard to
justify in complex scenarios such as those found in electronic auctions. This may be
due to a variety of reasons such as computational hardness, dependence on private
information or the prior, non-intuitiveness of the situation, or repeated aspects of
the game.
A recent paper [Nekipelov et al., 2015] suggested using a much weaker assump-
tion than the equilibrium assumption. This was demonstrated in the specific context
of ad auctions (of the type that are also known as “sponsored-search auctions”), but
can be applied to every repeated-game scenario. The weaker assumption that they
promoted was that players minimize regret in the specific sense used in the regret-
minimization literature [Blum and Mansour, 2007] (sometimes known as “Hannan
consistent”). This notion assumes that players manage to achieve at least as much
utility as they could have gotten from playing any fixed action repeatedly. This
makes minimal assumptions about the players’ learning and rationalizing ability.
Certainly, if the players reach a Nash equilibrium, they must all be minimizing
their regrets, but the regret-minimization assumption is strictly weaker, and, for
example, holds even if the players reach any equilibrium from the much wider fam-
ilies of correlated or even coarse equilibria.
In [Nekipelov et al., 2015], ad-auction data from Microsoft was analyzed under
the regret-minimization assumption with the goal of estimating advertisers’ values
that are not known to the search engine (Microsoft), by using the bids that are
known to the search engine. Classic econometric methods were applied to this task
in [Varian, 2007] and [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010], and the average value estimates
that were obtained in [Nekipelov et al., 2015] seemed to be more or less in line with
those from the two other methods ([Varian, 2007] and [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010]).
However, since their data set lacked the real values of the advertisers it is not clear
how well each of these three econometric methods did, and, in particular, it is not
clear how good are the estimates that were obtained based on the weak regret-
minimization assumption.
It turned out that we had previously performed an experiment that yields exactly
the type of data that can allow evaluation of the success of econometric methods in
an ad-auction context [Noti et al., 2014]. In our experiment (described in Section
2), human players participated in a simulation of a stream of ad auctions. Unlike in
field data, in our controlled experiment we assigned valuations to the players, and
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so we can directly compare the value estimates of the econometric methods with
these real (assigned) values.
In the present paper we use this experimental data to evaluate the performance
of the regret-based method for estimating players’ values, in comparison with the
classic equilibrium-based estimation methods. We start by asking to what extent
humans succeed in minimizing their regret in the repeated auction, and find that
the answer depends on the “type” (private value) of the player (Section 3): while
higher-type players indeed rationally minimize their regret, the lower-type players
remain with high levels of regret. In Section 4 we specify our implementation of
the regret-based estimation method, and in Section 5 we evaluate this method in
comparison with the classic equilibrium-based methods. We find that the regret-
based method manages to perform at least as well as the other methods, even in the
truthful VCG auction where the equilibrium prediction is particularly strong. That
is, our findings suggest that the weaker assumptions and general approach of the
regret-based method are sufficient for this estimation task. In addition, we find that
while all methods perform reasonably well for the higher-type players, they result
in high errors for the lower-type players. In Section 6 we suggest several approaches
to improve the accuracy of the estimates, using the regret-based econometrics and
the understanding of the type-based bias that we identified.
2 Our Experiment
We performed a controlled experiment where human subjects were asked to par-
ticipate in a simulation of ad auctions, similar to those held by search engines like
Google or Microsoft. This experiment was described in [Noti et al., 2014], which
contains all the details as well as the results. In the experiment, we recruited par-
ticipants in groups of five. In each instance of the experiment, the five participants
simulated the roles of advertisers and had to compete in a stream of ad auctions
that lasted 25 minutes. We used a flexible auction experimentation software that
we developed that enabled us to control the auction details as well as the players’
knowledge and values. The auctions were conducted continuously, one auction per
second, to a total of 1500 auctions within the 25-minute game. The participants
could modify their bids at any time, and each auction was performed with the cur-
rent settings of the bids. Each player was assigned a “type” at random, which was
his private “valuation,” i.e., the monetary value that he obtained from each user
who clicked on his ad (we used 21, 27, 33, 39, 45 “coins”). Each ad auction sold
five ad positions with varying (commonly known) Click Through Rates (CTR) (we
used α = (2%, 11%, 20%, 29%, 38%)), which were displayed in a decreasing order
of CTRs, so that the position on the top of the page received the highest CTR.
Every time an advertiser with a valuation v won a position with CTR αk, he got an
3
Figure 1: Game interface.
income of αk · v from that auction. This income was added to his balance and the
appropriate payment according to the auction rule was deducted from his balance.
The players were given a graphical user interface in which they could modify their
bids as often as they wished, and follow the results of the auctions so far. Figure 1
shows a screen shot of the user interface.
The experiment had a two-way (2x2) between-participant design; thus there
were four experimental conditions. The two factors were:
1. Payment Rule (the Auction Mechanism): We compared the (theoreti-
cally appealing) VCG payment rule with the (commonly used) GSP payment
rule. Both VCG and GSP auctions make the same allocation of positions –
by decreasing order of bids – but their payment rule is different. Unlike GSP,
the VCG is truthful; i.e., in every VCG auction it is a dominant strategy for
every player to bid his true value (see [Edelman et al., 2007, Varian, 2007]).
2. Valuation Knowledge: While the starting point of analyzing behavior in
auctions is the “valuation” of the bidder, it is questionable to what extent users
are explicitly aware of this valuation. We compared the case where bidders
were directly given their valuation (given value, GV), and were explained its
significance, and the case where bidders were not directly given the valuation,
but rather only see their payoffs – information from which the valuation may
be deduced, but could alternatively be directly used to guide the bidding
(deduced value, DV).
There were a total of 24 experimental sessions, 6 sessions for each of the 4
experimental conditions (thus there were 12 sessions for each factor). The groups
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(a) Bid modifications frequency:
The average number of bid changes
per minute made by a player, in each
of the experimental conditions over
time.
(b) Social welfare: The average so-
cial welfare achieved in each of the
experimental conditions over time,
on a linear scale from worst to best
outcomes.
Figure 2: Previous results.1
(of five players each) were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions,
giving a total of n = 120 participants. For further details regarding the experimental
setup see [Noti et al., 2014].
Out of the various results of this experiment, let us mention two that have partic-
ular relevance to the question at hand regarding the assumptions of the econometric
model. The first result is that players in no way seemed to converge to an equi-
librium. In fact, players kept modifying their bids throughout the 25 minutes, and
the frequency of bid modification increased over time. Figure 2a shows the average
activity level (i.e., frequency of bid modification) as a function of time in the four
experimental conditions. This was true in all auction formats, even when using the
VCG auction rule with explicitly given valuations for which truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy and so we would have expected truthful bidding as a strong and
stable equilibrium prediction.
On the other hand, despite any lack of convergence to equilibrium, it seems that
the auction was able to quickly achieve close to the “correct” (social-welfare maxi-
mizing) allocation of the slots, attaining over 80-90% of the optimal level of welfare2
toward the end of the session (see Figure 2b), as well as extracting revenue to the
auctioneer that matches and even exceeds the theoretically expected revenue. This
1 Figures 2a and 2b are taken from [Noti et al., 2014].
2 Our count here is within the possible range of allocations, such that a random allocation
would get 50% of the welfare. In absolute terms, around 90-95% of the welfare was achieved. See
[Noti et al., 2014] for details.
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suggests that the different auction formats were able to extract the value informa-
tion from the users and utilize it, despite not having reached an equilibrium. This
would thus seem to indicate that it should be possible to deduce the (hidden) value
information from the (visible) auction bids, even though an equilibrium assumption
does not seem to hold.
3 ToWhat Extent Do Humans Minimize Regret?
We start by asking to what extent does the assumption that players minimize regret
in the repeated game hold in our experiment with human players? I.e. we compare
the actual utility achieved by each one of our participants to the optimal utility he
could have achieved had he played an optimal fixed bid in a sequence of auctions.
More formally, let bt denote the vector of actual bids played by the five players
at time t, and denote by Ui(b, b
t
−i|vi) the utility of player i whose value is vi by
bidding b at time t. Thus, player i’s actual utility in a sequence of auctions (bt)t
is Actuali((b
t)t|vi) =
∑
t Ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i|vi), where bti is the actual bid played by bidder i
at time t. The optimal utility that player i could have obtained by playing a fixed
bid repeatedly in all auctions (bt)t is Opti((b
t)t|vi) = maxb
∑
t Ui(b, b
t
−i|vi). The
regret of player i whose value is vi in a sequence of auctions (b
t)t is defined to be
the difference between his optimal and actual utilities in these auctions, i.e.,
Regreti((b
t)t|vi) = Opti((bt)t|vi)− Actuali((bt)t|vi)
For the VCG auction formats, the optimal fixed bid is certainly the dominant
strategy of bidding the true value, but for the GSP auction formats the optimal bid
depends on the bids of the other players and is only evident in hindsight (and thus
could not even theoretically be known to our bidders in real time.)
We define the regret of a set S of players just additively over the players in S.
That is, ActualS =
∑
i∈S Actuali, and OptS =
∑
i∈S Opti. Then, the regret of S
at a sequence of auctions (bt)t is RegretS((b
t)t) = OptS((b
t)t) − ActualS((bt)t) =∑
i∈S Regreti((b
t)t|vi). Since the level of regrets depends on the magnitude of the
utilities, we present the regret levels as percentages of the corresponding optimal
outcomes. Specifically, we define the relative regret of S at a sequence of auctions
(bt)t by
RelativeRegretS((b
t)t) =
RegretS((b
t)t)
OptS((bt)t)
First, in order for any regret minimization to be possible, we would need to
see some learning by the bidders as time progresses, and indeed that is what we
find. Figures 3a and 3b show the relative “momentary regret” of the players over
time by experimental conditions and by player types, respectively, where the mo-
mentary regret is the regret computed separately in each minute of the experiment.
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(a) By experimental conditions (b) By player types
Figure 3: Relative momentary regret over time. The momentary regret is
the gap, computed separately for each minute, between the utility achieved
by the players and the utility that would have been achieved had they played
the fixed strategy that was optimal for that minute.
Consistent with the regret-minimization assumption, we find that the momentary
regret decreased over time in all conditions and types. Specifically, for each of the
four experimental conditions, the average momentary regret in the first third of the
game is significantly higher than in the last third3 (N=6 sessions, Wilcoxon paired
two-sided signed rank test, p < 0.05 except for VCG-GV for which p = 0.06) and
the same for each of the five types of players (N=24, p < 0.001 for each type except
for 33 for which p < 0.03). The decrease was faster at the beginning when players
acquired experience in the game. This seems to be consistent with the suggestion
raised by [Nekipelov et al., 2015], that higher levels of regret may indicate that bid-
ders are in their initial learning phase. The regret toward the end of the game
reached low levels of around 15% regret for the different conditions, but, as can be
seen in Figure 3b, remained substantial for the lower-type players.
At this point we can look at the overall regret achieved by our players, and
answer the question to what extent is it true that bidders in ad auctions minimize
regret, at least after the initial learning phase. We compute the “total regret”
of a bidder based on the second half of the game (750 auctions), where regret
levels stabilized, indicating that players had completed the initial learning phase
and were experienced enough in the game.4 Looking according to the experimental
3When considering momentary regret, the first and last thirds of the game refer to the first
and last 8 minutes, respectively. The results are robust to other choices of partitioning.
4Qualitatively our findings are robust to modifications of the definition of the initial learning
phase.
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(a) By experimental conditions (b) By player types
Figure 4: Relative total regret of the bidders according to experimental con-
ditions and according to types of players. The total regret is computed over
the second half of the auctions game (750 auctions), and is presented as a
percentage of the corresponding optimal outcome.
conditions, the total regret seems reasonably low: a 10-20% loss (Figure 4a). The
total regret in GSP-DV was higher than in the other three conditions, as could
be expected, since this condition combines the two difficult settings – GSP and
DV – where bidders needed to learn both their opponents’ behavior and their own
values. Yet, the difference was significant at the 5% level only in comparison with
the GSP-GV condition.
However, a different story is revealed when examining bidders’ regret by their
types: we found that the type of a player, i.e., the value assigned to him at random
and used to determine his payoffs in all auctions, also had a significant effect on
his regret-minimization performance. Figure 4b shows the relative total regret for
the five types of players. It can be seen that the lower the type is, the higher
the player’s total regret: the highest-type players achieved low levels of regret – a
less than 6% loss – while the lowest-type players remained with very high levels of
regret – with a more than 50% loss of their optimal outcome.5 Specifically, there
is a significant negative correlation between the player’s type and his total regret
(N = 120, r = −0.68, p < 0.001). These differences between types were consistent
throughout the game, as can be seen in Figure 3b. Therefore, high levels of regret
may indicate not only that a player is in his initial learning phase, as suggested by
[Nekipelov et al., 2015], but also that he might be of a lower type relative to his
5Notice that the high percentage of regret of low-type players is not so high (though still higher)
in absolute additive terms, since they tend to win the low CTR slots anyway.
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opponents.
Thus, we see that players who were assigned (by chance) with “poor” types
turn out to play significantly less rationally than players who were lucky to get
“rich” types. While we were surprised at first to see such a significant gap, on
second thought this behavior seems quite intuitive: when the low-value players play
rationally they tend to “lose” in the auction, i.e., win the low CTR slots. This
is quite frustrating and so they keep trying to “win,” but to no avail since they
“should” be losing the auction according to their true value. This gap in rational
play is consistent with other irrational behaviors reported in [Noti et al., 2014] –
overbidding and high frequency of bid changes – that were also correlated with the
player types. It may be interesting to relate this to other settings where it was
found that “the poor act irrationally” (see, e.g., [Barr, 2012, Bertrand et al., 2004,
Steven J. Katz, 1994]). However, our controlled setting proves that this “irrational”
behavior cannot be explained by any characteristics of the poor themselves (e.g.,
lower education), but rather only being poor (in an inferiority) relative to the others
affected players’ rationality. These findings may be explained in terms of “auction
fever” [Ku et al., 2005, Heyman et al., 2004], as a form of an “illusion of control”
bias [Langer, 1975], or in terms of a stronger bias toward “winning.”
Finally, we should also note here that the regret is positive: in principle it is
possible to achieve negative regret (in the GSP auction) using time-varying bids. Yet
not a single one of the 60 players who participated in our GSP auctions managed
to achieve negative total regret. I.e., none of our players managed to utilize the
dynamics in the repeated game to their advantage and to play better than the
fixed-bid benchmark.
4 Regret-Based Econometrics
Before we proceed to the evaluation results, let us formally specify our implementa-
tion of the regret-based method, suggested by [Nekipelov et al., 2015], for estimat-
ing bidders’ valuations from their bids. For this estimation task, we now assume
that we observe only the bids played by the bidders and the fixed CTRs.
The regret-based estimation method is based on the assumption that players
use learning strategies that minimize their regret in the repeated game. That is,
they use bidding strategies by which, over time, their utilities are not much worse
than the optimal utilities they could have achieved by playing the best fixed bid
in hindsight. Thus, the method sets the value estimate for a bidder, in a sequence
of auctions, to be the value that minimizes his regret in these auctions. Again,
this assumption is weaker than the standard approach in econometrics, which relies
on the assumption that the observed game reaches a static equilibrium, and it is
general for different games (and, in particular, for different auction rules).
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Figure 5: Average total regret as a function of value according to player types
and experimental conditions. The value that gives the minimal total regret
for a player is given as the estimate for the player’s value.
Our implementation of the regret-based method is given in the “Regret-
Minimization” estimation procedure (Algorithm 1). The procedure is given as input
a sequence of bid profiles (bt)t (in our implementation we used (b
t)1500t=751, excluding
the first half of the game as an initial learning phase, as mentioned above), as well
as the players’ utility functions Ui(b, b
t
−i|v). Regret-Minimization estimates value vˆi
of each bidder i as follows: it begins by fixing the sets of possible valuations Vi and
of possible bids Bi to consider (we set Vi = Bi = {1, 2, ..., 60} for all bidders). Then,
for every possible value v ∈ Vi, it computes Regreti((bt)t|v) – the regret of player
i had his value been v – which in turn requires the computation of Actuali((b
t)t|v)
and Opti((b
t)t|v). Notice that in VCG, finding Opti((bt)t|v) (in line 8) does not
require iterating over all b ∈ Bi, as this optimal outcome is always obtained at
b = v. The estimate vˆi is then the value that minimizes this regret.
6 7
We applied the Regret-Minimization procedure to each of the bidders in the
experiment, and we evaluate the accuracy of the estimations in the next section.
6 The specific implementation in [Nekipelov et al., 2015] selected the value that minimizes the
relative regret.
7 Only for a single bidder of the 120 bidders in our data, the optimal v was not unique but
could only be located in the range of values (v ∈ [49, 52]). We used as our estimate the middle
point in this range.
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Algorithm 1 Regret-Minimization: regret-based estimation of bidders’ valuations.
1: Input: actual bid sequence (bt)t and functions Ui(b, b
t
−i|v) modeling players’
utilities
2: Output: players’ value estimates vˆ1, ..., vˆn
3: procedure Regret-Minimization
4: for bidder i ∈ N do
5: denote the set of possible valuations by Vi and the set of possible bids
by Bi
6: for v ∈ Vi do
7: Actuali ←
∑
t Ui(b
t
i, b
t
−i|v)
8: Opti ← maxb∈Bi
∑
t Ui(b, b
t
−i|v)
9: Regreti((b
t)t|v)← Opti − Actuali
10: vˆi = arg minv∈Vi Regreti((b
t)t|v)
11: return the estimates vˆ1, ..., vˆn
12: end procedure
Figure 5 presents the regret curves as a function of value, according to the types of
players and the experimental conditions. The minimum point for each player serves
as the estimate of his value, and is clearly visible in the graphs. As can be seen,
this minimum is achieved at a higher value as we move from lower to higher types,
consistent with the regret-minimization model. Also notice the asymmetry in the
slopes of the regret, as well as how it changes between low and high types, showing
that low types would have suffered low regret had their values been lower (as they
tend to get the low CTR positions anyway) and higher regret had their values been
higher, while the opposite is observed for the higher types.
5 Evaluating Regret-Based Econometrics
We are now ready to evaluate the success of the Regret-Minimization method in
estimating players’ private valuations, in comparison with standard econometric
methods that rely on the equilibrium assumption. The same regret-based estima-
tion procedure (Algorithm 1) works for both the VCG and GSP auctions, with
the payment rule taken into account in the calculation of the utilities, Ui(b, b
t
−i|v).
However, since these auction mechanisms have different equilibria, standard meth-
ods use different procedures in these two cases, and thus we perform the evaluation
separately for each mechanism.
We assess the quality of the estimation methods in percentages based on the
mean squares of the relative errors. Specifically, for every player i whose true
value is vi, we compute the relative estimation error: errori =
1
vi
|vi − vˆi|, where
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vˆi is the value estimate for player i. The estimation error on a set of players S
is: error(S) =
√
1
|S|(
∑
i∈S error
2
i ). We base the evaluation on the second half of
the auctions game: a stream of 750 auctions, excluding the first half as an initial
learning phase (as mentioned above).
5.1 Evaluating Estimations in VCG Auctions
We start by considering the VCG auction. The usual econometric treatment will
note that players have dominant strategies, so it should be a strong prediction
that they all bid these dominant strategies in equilibrium. The classic econometric
method will thus take as the model that each player bids his true value in each round,
plus an error term: bti = vi+
t
i, where vi is the true value and b
t
i is the bid in round t.
The estimate of the hidden value vi from the visible data of the b
t
i’s that were played
in a sequence of T auctions will be vˆi = (
∑T
t=1 b
t
i)/T , as this average minimizes the
sum of the squares of ti:
∑
t(v− bti)2. We applied the Regret-Minimization method
and the standard method of taking the average bid (“Average-Bid”) to estimate
the valuations of the bidders in the VCG sessions. Overall, considering all 60
VCG bidders, Regret-Minimization and Average-Bid performed very similarly, with
total estimation errors of 23.37% and 23.38%, respectively. The errors distributed
similarly, both with high variance between players: µ = 17.69% and σ = 15.39%
using Regret-Minimization, and µ = 17.37% and σ = 15.79% using Average-Bid.
The similarity persists when considering errors by information settings or by types
of players, as can be seen in Figures 6a and 6b. Thus, the estimation obtained
by the Regret-Minimization method, which is general for all auction formats, does
not fall from the estimation of the standard approach, even though the specific
equilibrium prediction for VCG is strong and is of the simple strategy of bidding
the true value.
Figure 6a shows that the estimation errors of both methods are somewhat larger
in the deduced-value setting (DV) than in the given-value setting (GV), as could be
expected, and the regret-based method seems somewhat better in the former setting
and somewhat worse in the latter. However, these effects were not statistically
significant.
A significant effect is revealed for both methods when considering errors by types
of players: as expected from the finding in Section 3 that the low types deviate
significantly from playing rationally, the estimation errors of both methods for the
low types are far larger than those for the high types (see Figure 6b). Specifically,
for each of the two methods, there is a significant negative correlation between the
estimation error and the player type (N = 60, ρ = −0.65 and ρ = −0.52 for Regret-
Minimization and Average-Bid, respectively, p < 0.001). The total estimation
error of both methods for the lowest-type players is reaching around 40%, while
12
(a) By conditions (b) By player types (c) VCG estimates
Figure 6: Estimation results in VCG sessions: Regret-Minimization (RM)
vs. Average-Bid (AB) methods. (a) and (b) present the estimation errors by
value-information conditions and by types of players, respectively. (c) presents
the average estimates of the two methods according to types of players. The
“differences table” below presents the averages of the differences between the
value estimates and the true values of the bidders, and the differences between
the value estimates using the two methods, by types, as indicated in the first
column. Significant differences are marked by *, **, and ***, for significance
at levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
for the highest-type players the error is much lower – around 13%. Despite the
overall similarity between the two methods, Figure 6b shows that while Regret-
Minimization is more accurate for the middle-valued types, Average-Bid is more
accurate for the lower-type players.8 In addition, as opposed to the significant
and gradual differences between estimation errors for different types using Regret-
Minimization (consistent with the gradual pattern of regret levels shown in Figure
4b), using Average-Bid the differences are only due to the error in estimating the
lowest type’s valuation, which was significantly higher than that of each of the other
types. But still, the errors of the two methods were not significantly different at
the 5% level also when tested for each type separately.
Finally, we found that Regret-Minimization and Average-Bid are different in
terms of the average estimates that they give. Figure 6c compares the average
estimates obtained by the two methods and the bidders’ true values (by types).
As can be seen, Regret-Minimization significantly overestimates the valuations of
the three lower-type bidders, and significantly underestimates the valuations of the
highest-type bidders. The direction of mistakes by Regret-Minimization gradually
changes from low to high types. These findings suggest that the low-type bidders
tend to play as if their valuation were higher and the opposite holds for the bidders
8 This pattern is robust for different choices that we tried of initial learning phases (i.e., other
than the first half of the game), and for some choices the interaction between method and player
types reaches statistical significance at 5% level.
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with the highest value, who tend to play as if their valuation were lower than it really
was. Interestingly, these tendencies do not clearly arise from the average estimates
of the Average-Bid method, and thus must be hidden in the dynamic strategies
played by the players relative to their opponents. In Section 6 we demonstrate how
we may improve the accuracy of estimations by taking advantage of the differences
between the two methods.
5.2 Evaluating Estimations in GSP Auctions
For the GSP auction the situation is much more complicated for equilibrium-based
econometric methods since there are no dominant strategies and there exist multiple
equilibria. There are two basic approaches in the literature for deducing bidders’
valuations in GSP auctions. In [Varian, 2007] it is suggested that the players should
reach the equilibrium of the full-information one-shot GSP game that gives the
VCG-prices (hence the “VCG-like” equilibrium). Assuming that this is indeed the
case, then at each time step t in a sequence of auctions, one may deduce values
vˆti for all players i from the actual bids b
t
i, such that the bids are this VCG-like
equilibrium of these deduced values. The final estimate is then the average of these
vˆti . Some complications arise when this is attempted on real data since it is often
the case that the bids do not correspond to an equilibrium of any tuple of values. In
these cases we follow [Varian, 2007] and perturb the bid observations in the minimal
possible way so as to satisfy the equilibrium constraints, and set the final estimates
to the perturbed values.9 These and other complications of the “VCG-like-NE”
method are discussed in Appendix A.1 and in [Varian, 2007].
A second method was suggested by [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010] where bidders
participate in a large number of auctions, and receive feedback that can vary from
auction to auction. The basic assumption is that each bidder is best-responding
to the distribution that he faces (by placing a single bid). Specifically, given a se-
quence of auctions, define functions Qi(bi) and TEi(bi) as the expected CTR and
the expected total expenditure, respectively, of bidder i by bidding bi. Thus, his
expected utility with valuation v is Qi(bi)·v−TEi(bi). Against smooth distributions
the best bid would be a strictly increasing function of the value. In these cases,
the valuation of bidder i who maximizes his expected utility by bidding bi can be
recovered using the first-order condition by vˆi =
∂TEi(bi)/∂bi
∂Qi(bi)/∂bi
. When applying this
method to actual data complications arise, and there are many possible implemen-
tations. We have tested several implementation variants, and in the implementation
we chose (referred to as the “Best-Response” method), we used the average bid that
9 In fact, only 13.3% of the auctions were consistent with the equilibrium inequalities without
perturbing their data. However, similar to [Varian, 2007], we observed that the required pertur-
bations were relatively small.
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(a) By conditions (b) By player types (c) GSP estimates
Figure 7: Estimation results in GSP sessions: Regret-Minimization (RM)
vs. Best-Response (BR) vs. VCG-like-NE (VNE) methods. (a) and (b)
present the estimation errors by value-information conditions and by types of
players, respectively. (c) presents the average estimates of the three methods
according to types of players. The “differences table” below presents the
averages of the differences between the value estimates and the true values of
the bidders, by types, as indicated in the first column. Significant differences
are marked by *, **, and ***, for significance at levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
a bidder played as his best-response to the distribution of the bids of the others
(since bids were not constant), and found the value by optimizing directly using
grid search (since the empirical derivatives had their own complications). Details
of implementation and complications of this method are discussed in Appendix A.2
and in [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010].
Figures 7a and 7b compare the estimation error of the regret-based method
with those of the two “classic” equilibrium-based methods. Overall, the regret-
based method tends to be better than the other two methods, but the difference
is statistically significant at the 5% level only in a comparison with the VCG-
like-NE method.10 Specifically, over all 60 GSP bidders, the total estimation er-
rors obtained using Regret-Minimization, Best-Response, and VCG-like-NE were
25.51%, 28.94%, and 30.60%, respectively. The average of the estimation errors us-
ing Regret-Minimization, Best-Response and VCG-like-NE, were 18.07%, 20.04%,
and 21.45%, respectively, and the standard deviations were 18.00%, 20.87% and
21.82%, respectively.
Considering estimation errors by information settings (Figure 7a), the errors of
all three methods are somewhat larger in the deduced-value setting (DV), in which
case the regret-based method has an advantage over the other two methods. While
this appears to be quite consistent (for different selections of the initial learning
10The error using the Best-Response method was lower than the error using VCG-like-NE at a
significance level of 10%.
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phase), it is only partially statistically significant.
As in the case of VCG, the significant effect is revealed when considering errors
by player types (see Figure 7b): all three methods succeed better in estimating
valuations of the higher-type players (who succeeded better in minimizing their
regret) than of the lower-type players (who remained with high levels of regret, see
Section 3), for whom all methods perform very poorly. Specifically, for each of the
three methods, the estimation errors are negatively correlated with the player type
(N = 60, ρ = −0.59, ρ = −0.47, and ρ = −0.57 for Regret-Minimization, Best-
Response, and VCG-like-NE, respectively, p < 0.001). When comparing estimation
errors for each type separately, the differences are statistically significant only for
types 27 and 33: the error using Regret-Minimization is lower at 5% level than the
error using VCG-like-NE for types 27 and 33, and Best-Response is also better than
VCG-like-NE at 5% level for type 33.
Finally, we found that the three methods are similar in terms of the average
estimates that they give. As can be seen in Figure 7c, all three methods tend to
overestimate the valuation of the three lowest types. Thus, also in GSP, where
bidders are expected to shade their bids, lower types play as if their value were
higher, in consistency with their high levels of regret described in Section 3. The
estimations of the two highest types are not significantly in a particular direction
relative to the values. The direction of mistakes changes gradually across types, as
in the case of VCG.
6 Possible Improvements
We have seen, in the previous section, that the regret-based estimation method gives
value estimates that are competitive with standard econometric methods both in
GSP and in VCG. Thus, the weaker assumptions that the regret-based method
makes seem sufficient for this estimation task. However, we have also seen how
all methods have quite high errors, particularly on the lower-type players, who,
as we found, tend not to follow the methods’ underlying assumption of rationality.
Therefore we ask: how can we improve the accuracy of the estimations using regret-
based econometrics and our understanding of the biases of human players?11
First, it may be useful to combine estimates of the different estimation methods,
taking advantage of the differences between them, as the different methods catch dif-
ferent aspects of behavior and may have different sources of mistakes. For example,
we averaged the estimates of the Regret-Minimization and Average-Bid methods
11One general approach one may try is to “clean” the data, i.e., remove outlier observations that
might bias the estimates. However, our attempts in this direction did not improve the estimation
accuracy and even slightly increased the error, indicating that this error is not a result of the ends
of the bid distributions but is inherent in the bidders’ behavior.
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(a) Improving by “un-biasing” the
estimates according to player types.
Original and fixed (un-biased) esti-
mation errors for the GSP bidders.
(b) Improving by the “regret-based
average” method, which estimates
using the entire regret curve rather
than just the minimal regret point.
Figure 8: Possible improvements of the value estimates.
for each of our VCG bidders, and the estimation error of the combined method
was lower than the error of each of the two methods separately (23.37%, 23.38%,
and 21.73%, for the Regret-Minimization, Average-Bid, and the combined method,
respectively; however the differences in our results were statistically significant at
the 5% level only with the Regret-Minimization method).
A second approach is to “un-bias” the estimates according to player types, taking
advantage of our finding that the bias of all methods was correlated with the types of
players. Since this seems to result from systematic differences in behavior between
player types, where the lower-ranked players tend (irrationally) to play as if their
value were higher, it is useful to know to what extent we could have improved the
estimates had we known how to quantify and correct this bias. We demonstrate the
potential gains of un-biasing the estimates on our GSP bidders: for every bidder,
we calculated his most frequent position in the auction, and used this information
to “un-bias” our estimate according to the average bias of the estimates of his
(deduced) rank. For example, let vˆ be the estimate using Regret-Minimization of a
GSP bidder who was most frequently observed in the last position. Then, we use
the finding that on average Regret-Minimization overestimates the lowest type as
137% of his true value, and we fix the estimate accordingly, so that vˆfixed = vˆ/1.37.
This correction of the bias significantly improved the results of all three methods for
the GSP bidders, as can be seen in Figure 8a. Of course, since this bias-correction
factor (137% in the example) came from within the sample using the real values, one
can only interpret these reduced estimation errors as an upper bound on the gains
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from correcting by types. Our demonstration here suggests that these gains may be
substantial, indicating that it is worthwhile to further understand the behavioral
tendencies of the different types.
Finally, we suggest improving the estimates of the Regret-Minimization method
by taking advantage of the shape of the regret curves, which we found to be differ-
ent for the different types of players (see Figure 5). Since we observed that human
bidders do tend to minimize their regret, but do not minimize perfectly, we suggest
setting the estimate based on the entire regret curve rather than just on the minimal
regret point. For example, we set the value estimate of a bidder i to the weighted
average of all possible valuations, with weights that are proportionally decreasing
in the regret: vˆi =
∑
v∈Vi v·Regret
−1
i (·|v)∑
v∈Vi Regret
−1
i (·|v)
. This “regret-based average” method is com-
pletely applicable based on observed data only, and, as can be seen in Figure 8b,
significantly improves the accuracy of the estimates for our bidders. In a separate
paper we explore this approach further [Nisan and Noti, 2017].
7 Conclusions and Further Directions
We have demonstrated that, at least in our repeated ad-auction experiment, play-
ers do act to reduce their regret, and that the regret-based method suggested by
[Nekipelov et al., 2015] for estimating players’ values from their bids is (at least)
competitive with “classic” equilibrium-based econometric methods. We find this
to be especially significant due to the generality and simplicity of the regret-based
method: while “classic” econometric methods require choosing between different in-
terpretations of equilibria as well as among many significant implementation details,
and to tailor the method to the specific equilibrium assumptions, the regret-based
econometric method does not require any specific tailoring and hence is much eas-
ier to specify and implement. We furthermore speculate that this simplicity may
reasonably allow this method to be further improved, and we suggested possible
improvement approaches of this form.
En route we also observed irrational bidding in our experiment and identified a
distinct human bias: players with “low” types tend to overbid leading to high regret,
and resulting in increased estimation errors in all the econometric methods that we
tried. It is an interesting challenge to use our understanding of this behavioral bias
to improve the estimates, and we demonstrated that the improvements based on
this bias may be substantial. Regret-minimization is a simple and powerful method
that can be easily modified to capture different behavioral phenomena and to take
advantage of insights from behavioral disciplines. Obviously, further evaluation of
regret-based econometrics in more scenarios is called for.
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APPENDICES
A Summary of Existing Estimation Methods for
GSP
The case of GSP auctions is more complicated for standard econometric methods
that are based on the equilibrium assumption, since it is less clear to which equi-
librium bids should converge; unlike VCG, in GSP players do not have dominant
strategies and there might be multiple equilibria which might be complex in the
repeated game. There are two main approaches in the literature for deducing bid-
ders’ valuations in GSP auctions: the first assumes bidders reach the equilibrium
of the full-information game, that gives the VCG-prices (thus “VCG-like” equilib-
rium) [Varian, 2007, Edelman et al., 2007]; the second refers to the uncertainty in
the game and assumes bidders best respond to the distributions they experience
[Athey and Nekipelov, 2010].
A.1 The VCG-like-NE Method
A.1.1 Method Overview
[Varian, 2007] and [Edelman et al., 2007] suggested it is reasonable to assume that
bids in GSP implement equilibria of the induced full-information one-shot game.
They focus on the set of “Symmetric Nash Equilibrium” 12 (SNE), and particularly
point to the specific SNE that gives the VCG-equilibrium prices, as the equilibrium
12[Varian, 2007] presented the “Symmetric Nash Equilibria”, which are Nash equilibria in which
no bidder can benefit from exchanging position and payment with any of the other bidders.
[Edelman et al., 2007] presented (almost) equivalent class of equilibria they termed “Locally Envy-
Free Equilibria”.
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that is most plausible to be implemented by the players. [Varian, 2007] suggested
a procedure for deducing bounds on valuations assuming bids in every auction are
at an SNE, and applied it to actual ad auctions. Here we follow this procedure
as the first “classical” equilibrium-based estimation of the bidders’ values, that is
compared to the Regret-Minimization procedure.
Assuming a given bid profile is an SNE, [Varian, 2007] showed that the bidders’
(unobserved) values are bounded by the (observed) incremental cost per click (ICC)
of moving up or down one position. Specifically, if (b1, ..., bn) is an SNE (and bids
are numbered by decreasing order), then the value vk of the bidder in the k’th
(k > 1) position is bounded by
αk−1bk − αkbk+1
αk−1 − αk ≥ vk ≥
αkbk+1 − αk+1bk+2
αk − αk+1 (1)
For the highest ranked bidder, this equilibrium assumption does not provide an
upper bound, and implies only that his value must be at least as high as the value
of the second highest bidder. If the bids are at the VCG-like equilibrium, where
prices are minimal among SNE prices, then values equal the upper bound in the
inequality, i.e., each value equals the ICC of moving to the next higher position.
Applying (1) iteratively in an auction of five players as in our setting, gives that the
valuations corresponding to a VCG-like equilibrium bids (b1, ..., b5) (in decreasing
order) must satisfy the following
v1 ≥ α1b2 − α2b3
α1 − α2 = v2 ≥
α2b3 − α3b4
α2 − α3 = ... ≥
α4b5
α4 − α5 = v5 ≥ b5 (2)
When using the ICC to estimate valuations of each of the bidders separately
on real data, the estimates do not necessarily satisfy the SNE inequalities in (2).
[Varian, 2007] viewed these inconsistencies as resulting from the gap between the
full information case and the uncertainty in real auctions and suggested to resolve
them by perturbing the observations, in the “minimal” possible way as to satisfy
the equilibrium constraints, and set the final estimates to the perturbed values.
A.1.2 Our Implementation
Algorithm 2 specifies the “VCG-like-NE” estimation procedure, which we applied
to each of the GSP experiment sessions, as the first comparison alternative to the
regret-based estimation method. As in Regret-Minimization (see Section 4), we
focused on the second half of the auctions game, excluding the first half as the
initial learning phase (i.e., using (bt)1500t=751).
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Algorithm 2 VCG-like-NE: estimating bidders’ valuations in GSP sessions, assum-
ing bids at every auction are at the Nash equilibrium that gives the VCG prices.
1: Input: actual bid sequence (bt)t and parameters of the GSP auction α.
2: Output: players’ value estimates vˆ1, ..., vˆn.
3: procedure VCG-like-NE
4: for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T do
5: order the bidders by decreasing order of bti
6: vˆt1 ← Infinity
7: for all 1 < i ≤ n: vˆti ← αi−1b
t
i−αibti+1
αi−1−αi . set ICC as in (2)
8: if vˆt is not consistent with (2) then . fix inconsistencies
9: d← GetMinimalPerturbations(bt)
10: for all 1 < i < n: vˆti ← αi−1b
t
i−αibti+1di
αi−1−αi
11: vˆtn ← αn−1b
t
n
αn−1−αn
12: vˆt1 ← vˆt2 . set highest value
13: (vˆ1, ..., vˆn)← ( 1T
∑
t(vˆ
t
1), ...,
1
T
∑
t(vˆ
t
n))
14: return the estimates vˆ1, ..., vˆn
15: end procedure
16:
17: function GetMinimalPerturbations(bt)
18: return arg mind
∑
i(di − 1)2 s.t. for all i:
αi−1bi−αibi+1di
αi−1−αi ≥
αibi+1−αi+1bi+2di+1
αi−αi+1
19: end function
Figure 9: The distribution of the mean absolute deviations from an SNE of
GSP auctions in the experiment (the second half of the auctions game).
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(a) By value-information conditions (b) By player types
Figure 10: Estimation errors in GSP sessions using VCG-like-NE: errors of
estimates using perturbations (VCG-like-NE) vs. using the raw ICC estimates
without perturbing the data (VCG-like-NE Raw).
A.1.3 Implementation Remarks
Perturbations When the observed bids bt were not consistent with the SNE
model (lines 8-11), we fixed the inconsistencies (i.e., satisfied the equilibrium in-
equalities in (2)), as in [Varian, 2007], by perturbing for every bidder i ∈ {2, 3, 4}
the bid that follows him in the ranking of bidders bi+1, which is the only variable in
these inequalities that each bidder could not directly observe. As in [Varian, 2007],
we chose the minimal perturbations by solving the quadratic programming prob-
lem in subroutine GetMinimalPerturbations, and set the estimates to the perturbed
valuations.
Only 13.3% of the auctions were consistent with the equilibrium inequalities
without perturbing their data. However, similar to [Varian, 2007], we observed
that the required perturbations were relatively small. Figure 9 shows the distri-
bution of the mean absolute deviation from an SNE in each auction, defined as
1
5
∑5
i=1 |di− 1| (setting d1 = d5 = 1). The histogram looks similar to the histogram
in [Varian, 2007], with an average of 3.65% and median 2.88%. Interestingly, per-
turbing the data did not improve estimation results, but, in fact, slightly increased
the estimation errors, as can be seen in Figure 10. Over all 60 GSP bidders, the
estimation error was 30.60% when using perturbations and 26.80% using the raw
ICC without perturbing the data (the difference was not statistically significant).
Highest Ranked Bidder The VCG-like-NE method provides only a lower bound
for the highest ranked bidder and thus it is unclear what should be the estimation
23
of his value. We tried two reasonable implementations: estimating his value as the
second highest value, or as the maximum between the second highest value and his
own bid in the auction. We chose the first implementation (in line 12) since it gave
a slightly lower estimation error (30.60% vs. 30.76%, respectively, over all GSP
bidders).
A.2 The Best-Response Method
A.2.1 Method Overview
[Athey and Nekipelov, 2010] suggested a method for deducing bidders’ valuations
in GSP auctions that takes into account the uncertainty in the game. They consider
a framework in which bidders participate in a large number of auctions, and receive
feedback that can vary from auction to auction. The basic assumption is that
bidders are best responding to the distributions that they experience.
Given a sequence of auctions, define functions Qi(bi) and TEi(bi) as the ex-
pected CTR and the expected total expenditure, respectively, of bidder i who bids
bi through all these auctions, with the expectation taken over the distribution of
the uncertainty. Thus, the expected utility of bidder i who bids bi and has value per
click v is Qi(bi) · v− TEi(bi). With sufficient uncertainty in the environment, these
functions are strictly increasing and differentiable in bi. In these cases
13, the valu-
ation of bidder i who maximizes his expected utility by bidding bi in the auctions’
sequence, can be recovered using the first-order condition (FOC), as follows
v =
∂TEi(bi)/∂bi
∂Qi(bi)/∂bi
(3)
Note that in order for bi to be a best-response bid for a bidder with value v, it is
also required to verify for global optimality of the bid, as (3) guarantees only local
optimality.
The original model considers that bidders face uncertainty about “quality scores”14
and the set of competitors. These specific sources of uncertainty do not exist in our
controlled experiment, but the uncertainty in our case is due to the distribution of
bids of the other bidders.
A.2.2 Our Implementation
Algorithm 3 specifies the “Best-Response” estimation procedure, which is our im-
plementation of the method suggested by [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010], and is the
13When this is not the case, [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010] show how to derive bounds on valua-
tions.
14 In actual sponsored search auctions, ads are ranked not only by their bids but also by the
quality score that the search engine assigns to each ad, a score that can vary between auctions.
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second “classical” equilibrium-based method that we compare with the regret-based
estimation. Similar to the Regret-Minimization procedure (see Section 4), we focus
on the second half of the game and use (bt)1500t=751.
Algorithm 3 Best-Response: estimating bidders’ valuations in GSP sessions, as-
suming bidders best-respond to the distributions they experience.
1: Input: actual bid sequence (bt)t and parameters of the GSP auction α.
2: Output: players’ value estimates vˆ1, ..., vˆn.
3: procedure Best-Response
4: for bidder i ∈ N do
5: denote the set of possible valuations by Vi and of possible bids by Bi
6: for b ∈ Bi do
7: Qi(b) =
1
T
∑
t αpositioni(b,bt−i)
8: TEi(b) =
1
T
∑
t paymenti(b, b
t
−i)
9: for v ∈ Vi do
10: BRi(v) = arg maxb∈Bi(Qi(b) · v − TEi(b))
11: b∗i =
1
T
∑
t b
t
i
12: vˆi = v s.t., b
∗
i ∈ BRi(v)
13: return the estimates vˆ1, ..., vˆn
14: end procedure
A.2.3 Implementation Remarks
The “Best-Response” procedure estimates valuations separately for each bidder,
assuming the bidder’s average bid b∗i in the given sequence of auctions is a best-
response to the distribution of the bids of the others in these auctions. Rather than
using the empirical derivatives, as in [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010], we optimized
directly using a grid of Vi = Bi = {1, 2, ..., 60} for all bidders i ∈ N (see discussion
below). Specifically, for each value v ∈ Vi, we compute the set of fixed best-responses
BRi(v) = arg maxb∈Bi(Qi(b) · v − TEi(b)). The estimate for bidder i is set to the
value for which the average bid belongs to its best-response set (in line 12). If there
is no such a value (i.e., b∗i is not a best-response to any of the integer valuations on
the grid), then the estimate is set to the average of the two adjacent values v and
v + 1 for which b∗i > max(BRi(v)) and b
∗
i < min(BRi(v + 1)).
15
15For two of the bidders the average bid b∗i was larger than the maximal best-response to the
maximal value on grid. In these cases we set the bidders’ estimated values to the maximal value
on the grid. In two other cases, where b∗i was a best response to a range of valuations rather than
to a unique value, we set the estimation to the middle point in the obtained range and compute
the related estimation error relative to the range.
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Figure 11: Estimation errors of the Best-Response variants over all GSP
bidders. The variants are described in Section A.2.3.
Implementation Variants One can think of many other implementations to the
method suggested by [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010]. Figure 11 presents the estima-
tion errors obtained using several of the variants that we have tested, each variant
changes the Best-Response procedure in one aspect. The first “FOC” variant that
we looked at follows [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010] directly and finds the value us-
ing the first-order condition in equation (3) rather than using direct search on a
grid. This was sensitive to outlier bids and achieved worse estimation results. The
“FOC-Excluding-Outliers” presents the estimation errors obtained when modifying
the FOC method by removing outliers: computing the average b∗i excluding bids b
t
i
that were more than two standard deviations away from the average 1
750
∑1500
t=751 b
t
i.
Two other variants that we attempted are: (1) the “Full-Game” variant considers
the entire game rather than focusing on the second half of the game, and specifi-
cally computes for every bidder the average bid b∗i and the functions Qi and TEi in
respect to the 1500 auctions of the game; (2) the “Average-Value” variant computes
an estimate vˆti separately for every auction t (specifically by using b
t
i rather than
b∗i , and executing the procedure for every auction t to obtain vˆ
t
i), and determines
the final estimate vˆi as the average of these values. This is a different approach
for handling the difference from the situation in [Athey and Nekipelov, 2010] where
bids were assumed to be constant. As can be seen in Figure 11, these variants were
either worse or just marginally better than our choice of the basic “Best-Response”
method. The variability does highlight, however, the breadth and significance of
implementation details when using this method.
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